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NON-CONTESTING CLAUSES IN WILLS
By SuMNER KENNER*
The making of a will is one of the most solemn and conse-
quential acts of a man's life. Upon its legal and proper prepa-
ration depends the future happiness and welfare of the persons
and objects most dear to him. Although wills are often regarded
as the simplest of instruments, they are never failing sources
of litigation. It is an astonishing fact that most men spend
their lives in accumulating a fortune for the use and enjoyment
of surviving loved ones, but will delay the execution of this
most important instrument until their thoughts have been in-
sistently directed to the fact of the inevitable journey to the
great beyond. At this time probably the mental faculties of the
testator may have become so impaired by age or the ravages
of disease that his act would only invite a contest. The fact
that many testators attempt to draft their own wills without
the aid of legal advice is another illustration of their lack of
appreciation of the importance of the instrument.
Also, other testators employ a minister or a justice of the
peace, because their services can be obtained at a less price than
skilled services are worth, and, by so doing, usually get about
what they pay for.
It may be said that a will is the most intricate as well as the
most important of all legal documents. A man may make a
deed or other written contract and it may be reformed or set
aside on equitable grounds. Not so with a will after the testa-
tor's death. The court and parties must take it as they find it,
and, if valid, abide by the intent embodied in it so far as that
can be discovered.
There is no judicial power even to correct a will which ex-
tends beyond the field of construction and interpretation.
* See biographical note, p. 306.
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In the law of wills, it is well settled that no precise form of
words is necessary in order to create a condition, and that any
expression disclosing the intention will have that effect.1
Conditions found in wills are either precedent or subsequent;
in other words, either the performance of them is made to pre-
cede the vesting of an estate, or the non-performance to deter-
mine an estate antecedently vested.2 There is no distinction
in the way of technical words between conditions precedent and
conditions subsequent. The distinction is a matter of con-
struction, dependent upon the intention of the testator as mani-
fested by the will.3 As said by an early writer:
"Divers words there be, which by virtue of themselves make estates
.pon condition."4
The tendency of the Courts is to construe a condition as sub-
sequent rather than as precedent, so as to give the devisee a
present estate liable to be divested, rather than to defer the
vesting.5
One form of condition which the practitioner frequently comes
in contact with is that condition which provides for forfeiture
of benefits on beneficiaries contesting the will. On account of
the vast amount of litigation in the Courts of this country grow-
ing out of wills, many of which are contests thereof, there is
a demand among clients wishing wills prepared, that the attor-
ney insert some binding condition which will avert a future con-
test which so often brings to light matters of private life that
ought never to be made public, and in respect to which the
voice of the testator can not be heard, either in explanation or
denial.
It is this demand that has resulted in there being more non-
contesting clauses inserted in wills written today than ever
before, and makes the question as to the legal effect of such
clauses one of great importance to the active lawyer.
In the early cases, we find some courts holding provisions
12 Jarman in Wills, 5th Ed. pg. 1.
2 As to conditions precedent, see: Moore v. Perry, 42 S. Car. 369, 20
S. E.200; Fisher v. Fisher, 80 Nebr. 145, 113 N. W. 1004; Oetgen v. Diem-
mer, 115 Ga. 1005, 42 S. E. 388; Yale College v. Runkle, 8 Fed. 576, 10
Biss. (U. S.) 300. As to conditions subsequent, see: Tappan's Appeal,
52 Com. 412, Smith v. Smith, 64 Nebr. 563, 90 N. W. 560.
34 Kent; Com.; 124; Finlay v. King, 3 Pet. 346; Hopkins v. Smith,
162 Mass. 444, 38 N. E. 1122.
4Littleton 328.
5Thompson on Wills, p. 250.
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of this nature in wills invalid from the standpoint of public
policy.6
There is also a well defined line of cases holding such clauses
of no force where there is probable or reasonable ground exist-
ing for the contest or dispute of the will.y
There are also cases holding such clauses invalid where the
condition is annexed to a legacy without any provision for a
gift over on breach of such condition.8 It has also been held that
such clauses are inoperative against infants.9
In regard to petsonal property, provisions providing for for-
feiture in case of a contest have been construed as a mere
threat, held in terrorem over the legatee, but not intended to
deprive him of his interest.'0
Upon the question as to whether the conditions under con-
sideration are void, as against public policy, we may gather the
argument advanced in support of such a contention from the
following quotation:
"The condition," they say, "is void, whether there be a devise over or
not, as trenching on the liberty of the law, Shep. Touch. 132, and violating
public policy. It is the interest of the state that every legal owner should
enjoy his estate, and that no citizen should be obstructed by the risk of
forfeiture from ascertaining his rights by the law of the land. It may
be politic to encourage parties in the adjustment of doubtful rights by
arbitration or by private settlement; but it is against the fundamental
principles of justice and policy to inhibit a party from ascertaining his
rights by appeal to the tribunal established by the state, to settle and deter-
mine conflicting claims. If there be any such thing as public policy it must
embrace the right of a citizen to have his claims determined by law.""1
6 Mallet v. Smith, 6 Rich. Eq. 12, 60 Am. Dec. 107, see dissenting opin-
ion; Schouler on Wills, 2nd ed. sec. 605; see dissenting opinion of Evans,
Ch. J. in Moran v. Moran, (Iowa) 123 N. W. 202; Massy v. Rogers, Ir.
L. R. 11 Eq. 409.
' In re Friends Estate, 209 Pa. 442, 58 Atl. 853, 68 L. R. A. 447; Fifield
v. Van Wiyjok, 94 Va. 557; 27 S. E. 446, 64 Am. St. 745; Black V. Herring,
79 Md. 146, 28 Ati. 1063; Tate, et al., v. Camp, et al., (Tenn.) 245 S. W.
839.
8Fif/eld v. Van Wyck, 94 Va. 557, 27 S. E. 446, 64 Am. St. 745;
Cochran v. Cochran, 127 Pa. 486, 17 AtI. 981; Re Vandevort, 62 Hun. 612,
17 N. Y. Supp. 316. These holdings are to the effect that the condition
against contest is merely in terrorem where there is no gift over and not
effective to shut out the contestant from sharing under the will.
9 Bryant v. Thompson, 59 Hun. 545, 14 N. Y. S. 28, 37 N. Y. St. 431.
10 2 Jarman on Wills, 5th Ed. p. 57; Donegan v. Wade, 70 Ala. 501;
In re Arrow mith, 162 App. Div. 623, 147 N. Y. S. 1016; Fifield V. Van-
Wyck, 94 Va. 557, 27 S. E. 446, 64 Am. St. 745; Brown v. O'Barn, 199 N.
Y. Supp. 824; Re Marshall'Ps Estate, 196 N. Y. Supp. 330.
n Dissenting opinion in Mallet v. Smith, 6 Rich. Eq. 12, 60 Am. Dec.
107.
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In a rather recent case in Iowa12, the Chief Justice in dis-
8enting from the majority opinion, advances the argument most
used against non-contesting clauses. The learned judge said:
"I am convinced .... that such provision in a will is contrary to
public policy, unless it be limited in its application to those contests
wherein an element of bad faith enters. Under the law, no will can be-
come effective in any of its provisions until it shall have been admitted to
probate by the Court. Before admitting it to probate, it is the duty of the
Court to investigate the facts and circumstances attending its execution
and bearing upon its validity, and to find judicially therefrom that such
will was executed in due form, voluntarily, and understandingly by the
proposed testator. If the court should find otherwise, it must reject the
will and refuse its probate..... .If the court is to learn the truth from
outside sources of information, it is manifestly important that the highway
of information to the court be kept open, and that there shall be no lion
in the way. But here is a forfeiture provision in the purposed will itself,
which may be a roaring lion intended to terrorize every beneficiary of the
will. Its demand is that no adverse evidence be volunteered. Its tendency
is necessarily to suppress material facts, and thus to impede the adminis-
tration of the law according to its true spirit."
A Pennsylvania case1 3 stands as perhaps the strongest expon-
ent among the courts of last resort in favor of the exception
to the operation of the condition on the ground of probabilis
causa litigandi. In that case there was a provision in the will
that should any of the children or grandchildren contest the
validity of the will or attempt to vacate, alter or change any
of its provisions, then he should be deprived of any beneficial
interest thereunder and his share should go to others, naming
them. One of the children contested the admission to probate
of the will on the ground that its execution had been procured
by undue influence. After this unsuccessful attempt, it was
claimed that he had forfeited all claim under the will by virtue
of the non-contesting clause above set out. This contention was
not sustained by the Court below and on appeal the court held
that as the son had probable cause for instituting the proceed-
ings to contest the will, he had not forfeited the interest which
his mother gave him in her estate. Mr. Justice Brown, speak-
ing for the Supreme Court, says:.
"It is not to be questioned that it was competent for the testatrix
possessing the absolute power to dispose of what she possessed just as she
pleased, to impose the condition upon which the appellants rely in asking
that their brother shall be deprived of all interest in her estate; and it is
oqually clear, in view of his attempt to annul her will, that the burden
12 Moran v. Moran, (Iowa) 123 N. W. 202.
Is Re Fvend, 209 Pa. 442, 68 L. R. A. 447.
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is upon him to show that he now ought to have what it gives him. Such
conditions to testamentary gifts and devises are universally recognized as
valid, and, by some Courts, enforceable without exception. The better rule,
however, seems to us to be that the penalty of forfeiture of the gift or
devise ought not to be imposed when it clearly appears that the contest
to have the will set aside was justified under the circumstances, and was
not the mere vexatious act of a disappointed child or next of kin. A dif-
ferent rule,-an unbending one,--that in no case shall an unsuccessful
contestant of a will escape the penalty of forfeiture of the interest given
him, would sometimes not only work manifest injustice, but accomplish
results that no rational testator would ever contemplate. This is manifest
from a moment's reflection, and is illustrated by the class of cases to which
the one now before us belongs, in which there is an allegation of undue
influence which procured the execution of the will. If, as a matter of fact,
undue influence is successfully exerted over one about to execute a will,
that same influence will have written into it a clause which will make sure
its disposition of the alleged testator's property. He who will take advan-
tage of his power to unduly influence another in the execution of a will,
will artfully have a care to have inserted in it a clause to shut off all
inquiry as to the influence which really made the will; and, if the rule in-
voked by the appellants is to be applied with no case excepted from it,
those who unscrupulously play upon the feelings of the testator may, with
impunity, enjoy the fruits of their iniquity, and laugh in scorn at those
whom they have wronged."
This question was before the Supreme Court of South Caro-
lina in the year 1912, and in holding that a devisee or legatee
might contest the will on the ground of forgery, notwithstand-
ing a non-contest clause, that court said:
"No case has been cited, and we do not believe any can be found, sus-
taining the proposition that a devisee or legatee shall not have the right,
upon probable cause, to show that a will is a forgery, without incuring
the penalty of forfeiting the estate given to him by the will. The right
of a contestant to institute judicial proceedings upon probable cause, to
ascertain whether the will was ever executed by apparent testator, is
founded upon justice and morality. If a devisee should accept the fruits
of the crime of forgery under the belief, and upon probable cause, that
it was a forgery, he would thereby become morally a particeps criminis,
and yet, be confronted with the alternative of doing so, or of taking the
risk of losing all under the will, in case it should be found not to be a
forgery. Public policy forbids that he should be tempted in such a manner.
This is far more obnoxious to public policy than a condition in the will
against marriage."14
In a Tennessee case, the Court holds that a contest in good
faith and for probable cause will not cause a forfeiture under a
provision in a will that if any person shall enter any contest
of the will upon any ground whatever, such person shall forfeit
the provisions made for him. It was there held that an only
14 Rouse v. Branch, (S. C.) 74 S. E. 133, 39 L R. A. (N. S.) 1160.
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child devoting his life to his father's business for a meager
salary, who is on the best of terms with his father, and in
whose favor a will has been made leaving practically the whole
estate to him, has probable cause for contesting another will
made two years later, when the father is eighty-one years of
age and in poor health, in favor of a relation with whom he
was living.14
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has recently held that
condition of forfeiture in devise of real estate, if devisee shall
dispute will, does not work a forfeiture if there is probable
ground.14i
An eminent legal writer,15 in discussing this matter, says:
"To exclude all contest of the probate on reasonable ground that the
testator was insane or unduly influenced when he made it, is to intrench
fraud and coercion more securely; and public policy should not concede that
a legatee, no matter what ground of litigation existed, must forfeit his
legacy if the will is finally admitted. As for construction proceedings, the
testators own language may have rendered them necessary."
On the question as to who should decide whether the facts
developed show a probable cause for the contest, we find a
scarcity of adjudications. It has been held, however, that this
question must, in every case, be for the Court distributing the
estate of the testator, and that this probable cause must clearly
appear from the evidence, and if it is not clear, or if it is doubt-
ful whether there was a probable cause, then the will of the
testator should be regarded as supreme, and his direction to for-
feit carried out, and it has further been held that advice of
counsel is not of itself sufficient to show probable ground for
the contest of a will, so as to avoid the effect of a clause for-
feiting the interest of a legatee who institutes such contest.16
An exception to the operation of the condition where there
is no gift over upon breach in regard to a legacy has been re-
garded as established early in the English decisions.' 7  It is
claimed that it came to be recognized in England by the chan-
cery courts to preserve uniformity, since legacies could be sued
for and recovered in the ecclesiastical court, which followed the
rules of the civil law. It was held that as regard to personal
property, that the provision for forfeiture would be construed
141 Tate et al. v. Camp et al., (Tenn.) 245 S. W. 839, 26 A. L. R. 755.
141 Whilehurst v. Golwalt et al., (N. C.) 127 S. E. 582.
15 Schouler on Wills, 2nd ed. sec. 605.
16 Re Friend, 209 Pa. 442.
17 Powell V. Morgan, 2 Vern. 90;. Loyd v. Spillet, 3 P. Wins. 344; Morris
v. Burroughs, 1 Atk. 404; Cleaver v. Spurling, 2 P. Wins. 528.
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as a mere threat, held in terrorem over the legatee, but not in-
tended to deprive him of his interest. Only in the event that
the will made provision for a gift over would the conclusion
be adopted that the testator intended a forfeiture. Following
the English rule are found many American decisions holding
the condition of no effect in the absence of a gift over' s and
these use the same arguments above referred to in reference
to the English cases.
It has been held that a non-contest clause in a will is inopera-
tive as against an infant disputant. In a New York case,' 9 in so
holding, the court said:
"Any provision in a will which, in its application, comes in conflict
with the organic or statutory law of the state, by which it is made the
duty of the Courts to look after the rights of infants, irrespective of the
fact whether they are of tender years or not, must be deemed to be illegal
and void as being against public policy. A testator cannot be permitted
thus to obstruct, by any clause in his will, the necessary steps prescribed
by law for the conduct of judicial proceedings in the case of infants,
where the paramount duty of the Court is to act in behalf of its wards,
and for their best interests. No penalty or forfeiture can be worked
against such a party who has done nothing more than to submit his rights
to the adjudication of the Courts. Any other rule as applicable to in-
fants would work serious mischief."
On the other hand, Kentucky holds an infant bound by the
forfeiture clause, in so far that a court in its discretion may
refuse to allow a guardian to bring suit to contest a will which
has a non-contesting clause.29A
Notwithstanding some holdings to the contrary, the decided
weight of authority supports the validity of non-contesting
clauses in wills, as against the argument that they are against
public policy and against "the liberty of the law." A leading
case upon this question is Cooke v. Turner.20 The question in
that case arose upon a condition in a will to the effect that, if
a devisee should dispute the will, or the competency of the tes-
tator to make it, the devise thereby given to her should be re-
1SPray v. Belt, 1 Pet. 670, 7 L. ed. 309; Parsons v. Winslow, 6 Mass.
169, 4 Am. Dec. 107; McAlvaine v. Gethen, 3 Whatt. 575; Mallet v. Smith,
6 Rich. Eq. 12, 60 Am. Dec. 107; Maddow v. Maddox, 11 Gratt. 810; Bin-
nernan v. Weaver, 8 Md. 517; In re Hamilton's Will, 165 N. Y. Sup. 71;
Cochran v. Cochran, 127 Pa. 486, 17 At]. 981.
19 Bryant v. Thompson, 59 Hun. 545, 14 N. Y. Sup. 28. See also along
the same line Woodward v. James, 44 Hun. 95; Re Vandevort, 62 Hun.
612, 17 N. Y. Sup. 316; Bryant v. Tracy, 27 Abb. N. C. 183; Thompson
on Wills, sec. 290; 40 Cyc. 1706.
19A Moorman v. Louisville Trust Co., (Ky.) 203 S. W. 856.
20 Cooke v. Turner, 15 Mees. & W. 727.
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yoked. It was argued in that case that such a condition was
void, as against public policy, because having a tendency to set
up the wills of insane persons by restraining heirs named there-
in as devisees from contesting such wills, but the court in answer
to this argument, said:
"The conditions said to be void, as trenching on the liberty of the law,
are those which restrain a party from doing some act which it is supposed
the state has, or may have, an interest to be done. The state, from obvious
causes, is interested that its subjects should marry; and therefore it will
not in general allow parties, by contract or by condition in a will, to make
the continuance of an estate depend on the owner not doing that which
it is or may be the interest of the state that he should do. So, the state
is interested in having its subjects embarked in trade or agriculture, and
therefore will not allow a condition defeating an estate, in case its owner
should engage in commerce, or should plough his arable land, or the like.
The principle on which such conditions are void are analogous to that on
which conditions defeating an estate, unless the owner commits a crime,
are void. In the latter case the condition has a tendency to the violation
of a positive duty; in the former, to prevent the performance of what par-
takes of the character of a duty of imperfect obligation. But in the case
of a condition such as that before us, the state has no interest whatever
apart from the interest of the parties themselves. There is no duty on
the part of an heir, whether of perfect or imperfect obligation, to contest
his ancestor's sanity. It matters not to the state whether the land is
enjoyed by the heir or the devisees; and we conceive, therefore, that the
law leaves the parties to make just what contracts and what arrange-
ments they may think expedient, as to the raising or not raising questions
of law or fact among one another, the sole result of which is to give the
enjoyment of property to one claimant rather than another."
In a more recent case2 the Supreme Court of California uses
the following language along the same line of reasoning:
"Preliminarily, it Is to be observed that a condition such as this not
only does no violence to public policy, but meets with the approval of that
policy. Public policy dictates that the courts of the land should be open,
upon even terms, to all suitors. But this does not mean that it invites or
encourages litigation. To the contrary, it deplores litigation. Interest
reipunlicoe ut sit finis litium, and the great statute of frauds and perjuries,
-and the laws limiting the time of the commencement of actions, with many
other of its rules and doctrines, are all designed to give repose and secur-
ity by preventing litigation."
In upholding the forfeiture clause in a latter decision, the
same court sai: 21 5z
"Appellant's contention is that she had probable ground for contest.
.... No such exception is contained in the will, and we know of no prin-
ciple that authorizes us to declare it. To do so, would be to substitute
21 Re Hite, (Cal.) 101 Pac. 443, 21 L. 1. A. (N. S.) 953.
21 In re Miller's Estate, 156 Cal. 119, 103 Pac. 842.
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our own views for a clearly expressed intent of the testator to the con-
trary."22
The case of Smithsonian Institution v. Meeeh,2s being a de-
cision of the Supreme Court of the United States, is cited as a
leading case upholding clauses forbidding contest of wills, but a
careful study of that case will disclose the fact that the clause
in the will there in question was held to be of the nature of a
conditional limitation, and the acquiescence of the legatee in
the provisions of the will was held to be a material ingredient
or part of the gift, which was in the nature of a condition
precedent to his acquiring any right thereunder. The will in
that case did not forbid a contest, but the bequests were made
on the condition that the legatee acquiesce in the will and there
was a gift over in case of a dispute to the residuary legatee.
In the opinion on the case, Mr. Justice Brewer said:
"When legacies are given to persons, upon conditions not to dispute
the validity of or the dispositions in wills or testaments, the conditions
are not in general obligatory, but only in terrorem. If, therefore, there
exists probabilis causa litigande, the non-observance of the conditions .will
not be forfeitures (citing cases). The reason seems to be this: a court of
equity does not consider that the testator meant such a clause to determine
his bounty, if the legatee resorted to such a tribunal to ascertain doubtful
rights under the will, or how far his other interests might be affected
by it; but merely to guard against vexations. But when the acquiescence
of the legatee appears to be a material ingredient in the gift, which is
made to determine upon his controverting the will or any of its provisions,
and in either of those events the legacy is given over to another person,
the restriction no longer continues a conditional limitation. The bequest
is only quousque, the legatee shall refrain from disturbing the will, and if
he controvert it, his interest will cease and pass to the other legatee."
After quoting from decisions upholding conditional clauses,
the court concludes:
"The propositions thus laid down fully commend themselves to our
approval. They are good law and good morals. Experience has shown
that often after the death of a testator, unexpected difficulties arise, tech.
nical rules of law are found to have been trespassed upon, contests are
commenced, .... and as a result the manifest intention of the testator
Is thwarted. It is not strange, in view of this, that testators have desired
to secure compliance with their dispositions of property and have sought
to incorporate provisions which should operate most powerfully to accom-
plish that result. And when a testator declares in his will that his several
22 Cases may be found where provisions against contest are so worded
as to be held void on account of being too broad or indefinite. See Rhodes
v. Muswell Hill Land Co., 29 Beav. 560; Re Jackson, 47 N. Y. S. R. 443,
20 N. Y. Sup. 380.
23 Smithsonian Inst. v. Meech, 169 U. S. 398, 42 L. ed. 793, 18 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 396.
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bequests are made upon the condition that the legatees acquiesce in the,
provisions of his will, the court wisely held that no legatee shall without
compliance with that condition receive his bounty, or be put in a position
to use it in the effort to thwart his expressed purposes."
We have noticed the distinction drawn by several of the
Courts between real and personal property in considering the
validity of non-contest clauses, and many courts hold that there
must be a gift over before such clause would be valid as to
personal property. There is a tendency in the recent decisions
to wipe out any distinction between personal and real property
in a consideration of this matter. A leading case which con-
siders carefully this phase of the subject was decided by the
Supreme Court of California in the year 1909.24 The will there
in question contained a clause which provided that if any of
the heirs or devisees or anyone else contested the will, then they
should receive no part of the estate, and it further provided
that if such an event happened that he revoked any devise or
bequest to such contestant.
It will be noted that there was no provision made for a gift
over and one of the contentions of the attorneys for contestants
was that the clause was void for want of a gift over. In holding
against this contention, the higher court said:
"Respondent next urges that, even if it be held that the acts of Etta
Gross amount to a contest, yet, as she was a legatee, and there was no
gift over, of her legacy in the event of a contest, no forfeiture results.
It is recognized that a forfeiture of land devised will result, under such
circumstances, without a specific devise over. That decisions in abundance
may be found holding that the same rule does not apply in cases of legacy,
is an anomaly of the law of wills. It rests upon no substantial distinction,
and, where recognized, it is adopted in deference to the weight of earlier
adjudications. It was not a part of the common law, as such, but came
to be recognized in England by the chancery courts to preserve uniformity,
since legacies could be used for and recovered in the ecclesiastical courts,
which followed the rules of the civil law. By the civil law, the fiction was
introduced that, unless there was a gift over of such legacy, a forfeiture
would not be decreed ..... In this state the question is res integra. We
are not embarrassed in its consideration by any adjudication of our own,
and are at liberty to decide in accordance with sound reason. If it be that
the rule anciently rested for its support upon the doctrine of public policy,
we find, even in England, where the rule prevails, that such support has
been withdrawn. If it rests, as it seems to have rested in England, upon
the desire of the chancery court to conform to the decisions of the ecclesi-
astical court, such a reason does not, in this state obtain. In brief, no
reason can be found why such a rule, founded neither upon public policy,
nor the dictates of the common law, should by us be given recognition."
24 Re Hite (Cal.) 101 Pac. 443, 21 L. R. A. (N, S.) 953.
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The matter is summed up by Judge Redfield,25 in the follow-
ing language:
"The rule of the English law, as to conditions against disputing the
will, annexed to some bequests, seems to be in a most absurd state of con-
fusion. It is held that such a condition is entirely valid as to real estate,
whether there be any gift over or not. And it is agreed that there is no
substantial ground for any distinction in this respect between real and
personal estate. Hence, we assume that, in this country, any such condi-
tion which is reasonable, as one against disputing one's will surely is, as
nothing can be more in conformity to good policy than to prevent litigation,
will be held binding and valid."
In an Ohio case, a condition in a will whereby the testator
excludes any one of his heirs who "goes to law to break his
will" from any part of share of his estate, is valid and binding;
and effect will be given to it, as well in respect to bequests of
personalty, as to devises of real estate. A legacy forfeited by
the breach of such a condition will pass to the general residuary
legatees named in the will without express words to that effect
in the will. 251 The question often arises in cases of this kind
as to whether there really was a contest of the will. This must
be determined by the facts and circumstances in each case, al-
though it has been held that the mere filing of a caveat will not
be construed as a contest of a will,26 nor will instituting an action
to obtain the construction of a will be so considered.2 7
From the conflicting authorities, it is difficult to deduce
principles, but the following seem to be established and should
be followed in view of the unsettled condition of the law.2 8
25 2 Redf. Wills, sec. 679.
251 Bradford v. Bradford, 19 Ohio St. 546, 2 Am. St. Rep. 149.
26 McCahan's Estate, 221 Pa. 188, 70 Atl. 711. See also Bergland v.
Bergland, (Cal.) 192 Pac. 277 and note to 5 A. L. R. 1370.
27 Black v. Herring, 79 Md. 146, 28 Atl. 1063; Woodward aU. James,
44 Hun. 95; Matter of Von Saal, 145 N. Y. S. 307, but see Hoit v. Hoit,
42 N. J. Eq. 388, 7 Atl. 586.
28 See the following recent authorities on the various phrases of this
subject: Matter of Kirkholder, 149 N. Y. S. 87; Sherwood v. MeLaurin,
88 S. E. 363; In re Kathan, 141 N. Y. S. 705; Lewis' Est., 19 Pa. Dist. 432;
Matter of Arrowsmith, 147 N. Y. S. 1016; Brennen v. Hoard, 211 Fed.
336, 128 C. C. A. 14; Pray v. Belt, 26 U. S. 1 Pet. 680; Massie v. Massie,
54 Tex. Civ. App. 617, 118 S. W. 219; Perry v. Rogers, 52 Tex. Civ. App.
594, 114 S. W. 897; Bradford v. Bradford, 19 Ohio St. 546; Donegan v.
Ware, 70 Ala. 501; Re Wall, 136 N. Y. Sup. 452; Schouler on Wills, Execu-
tors and Administrators, 6th ed., and 1926 Sup., Sees. 1344, 2414, 3171;
Borland on Wills and Administration, pp. 361-363; Remson on Preparation
and Contest of Wills, pp. 218-220; Tucker's Notes on Wills, pp. 178-184;
Lewis' Preparation and Construction of Wills, pp. 325-345; Articles in 23
Columbia Law Review, 169; 13 Columbia Law Review, 557; 28 Harvard
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
1. Conditions annexed to legacies and devises, providing for
forfeiture in case the will is contested, are valid.
2. In case of a legacy, it is best to provide for a gift over of
the subject matter of the legacy in case of a breach of the
condition.
3. Where the will is contested on behalf of an infant legatee
or devisee, the forfeiture will not be decreed, irrespective of
whether there was a gift over or not.
4. In the preparation of the clause against contest, it is ad-
visable, if practicable, to make the condition precedent so that
the gift will not vest until the condition is performed, or in
other words, make the bequests upon the condition that the lega-
tees acquiesce in the provisions of the will.
5. It would seem that the probable cause exceptions should
be recognized as it comes most nearly approximating justice
in all cases, both from the standpoint of public policy and from
the probable intention of the testator. It would give effect to
the intentions of a rational testator in so far as it would prevent
the perpetration of such fraud and at the same time exclude
vexatious contests brought in bad faith without probable cause,
and which the testator probably wanted to guard against.29
Law Review, 153; American Bar Assn. Journal, Vol. 12, No. 4, page 236.
Rood on Wills, p. 416; 28 R. C. L. 315, Note in 5 A. L. R. 1370; Page on
Wills, sec. 683; Trust Co. v. St. John, (Conn.) 101 Atl. 961.
29 The state of Indiana has a statute providing that all non-contesting
clauses in wills shall be void and of no effect. Burns' Ann. Statutes, Sup.
of 1918, sec. 3154a. This law has never been tested and its validity is
doubtful.
